



TITLE:

GERMAN ECONOMIC POLICY IN TRANSITION—THE POLICY OF UNITING VERSUS RADICAL UNION—

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CITATION:

Ohno, Eiji. GERMAN ECONOMIC POLICY IN TRANSITION—THE POLICY OF UNITING
VERSUS RADICAL UNION—. Kyoto University Economic Review 1965, 35(1): 20-41

ISSUE DATE:

1965-04

URL:

<https://doi.org/10.11179/ker1926.35.20>

RIGHT:

THE KYOTO UNIVERSITY ECONOMIC REVIEW

MEMOIRS OF THE FACULTY OF ECONOMICS
IN THE KYOTO UNIVERSITY

Vol. XXXV, No. 1

APRIL 1965

Whole No. 78

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PUBLISHED BY

THE FACULTY OF ECONOMICS, KYOTO UNIVERSITY
SAKYO-KU, KYOTO, JAPAN

GERMAN ECONOMIC POLICY IN TRANSITION

—THE POLICY OF UNITING VERSUS RADICAL UNION—

By Eiji OHNO*

The motive from which I try, in this short paper, to analyse the Imperial German economic policy by placing Radical Union (Freisinnige Vereinigung) against the implementation of the "Policy of Uniting" (Sammlungspolitik) of the Imperial German regime and taking it up as a pivotal point for the discussion comes from the following three reasons:

First, the two opposing patterns of the German bourgeoisie are well disclosed in the confrontation between them which developed in the process of their policy making which greatly influenced the historic destiny of Imperial Germany (1871–1918). The pro-Junker behaviour of the bourgeoisie belonging to the camp that promoted "Sammlungspolitik" was naturally different from the anti-Junker behaviour of those who opposed it. This difference was not only temporary limited to the short period at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century when the "Sammlungspolitik" was actively pursued, but it was also a phenomenon that typically took place persistently through out the Imperial German regime. I think this should not be overlooked¹⁾.

Secondly, the viewpoint advocated by the circle of the Radical Union in criticizing "Sammlungspolitik" involves close study of the Imperial German economic policy as well as of the historical nature of her social structure that endowed the German bourgeoisie with its specific character and inherent nature.

In the third place, it is because the writer is inclined to believe that it might be possible to see a driving force in the making that eventually brought about the Weimar Republic, in the course of the development of the party line pursued by the Radical Union that went against the implementation of "Sammlungspolitik"²⁾.

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1) Refer to E. Ohno and K. Sumiya, "Analysis of German Capitalism and 'Capital Pattern'", Pt. 1, *Thought (Shiso)*, No. 2, 1964; "On Definition by Lenin of 'Junker-Bourgeois' Category", *Journal of Agrarian History (Tochiseidoshigaku)*, No. 17, 1962.

2) Recall the views, for instance, as described on p. 59 of Carl E. Schorske, *German Social Democracy*, where it says that "a faint adumbration of the later Weimar Coalition" can be recognized in the movements of Centrists, Progressives and Social Democrats who urged

Among these three reasons, this paper emphatically deals with typical characteristics of the German bourgeoisie, hence no analysis of the development of the political party called the Radical Union (Freisinnige Vereinigung) is intended to be made here.

I The "Policy of Uniting" as an Economic Policy in Transition

The social structure of Imperial Germany entered a transitional period with the withdrawal of Bismarck in 1890. For instance, Walther Lotz stated, in a paper contributed to the anthology issued in memory of Max Weber, that the resignation of Bismarck marked a turning-point in the entire political development of Germany as well as in her economic policy³⁾, and paid his keen attention to the fact that the German economic policy faced thereby the point of decision whether or not it was to abandon Bismarck's policy directed at the protection of the class interests of Junkers. He pointed out, however, that even with the policy adopted by Caprivi and his successors no policy that was divorced from the basic principle of Bismarck's policy could eventually be practised; and that their efforts ended in a "compromise policy" that made concessions to the demands of the Agrarier (agrarians). But, that he took the withdrawal of Bismarck (1890) as the turning-point in Imperial German economic policy, and that he viewed the period from 1890 to the 1st World War as a "transitional age where a policy of compromise had to be introduced" filled with most difficult problems which need minute analysis⁴⁾, interests us a great deal in the light of our approach to the subject.

The social structure of the new German empire created in 1871 under the "Iron Chancellor" Bismarck, entered into the process of down-fall with his withdrawal in 1890, and it is understood that by the bourgeois reform and with the subsequent formation of the Weimar Republic, the regime that lasted nearly half a century ended⁵⁾. Indeed, the social structure of Imperial Germany specified as "pseudo-Bonapartism"⁶⁾ is found to have reached the crossroad in the 1890's⁷⁾.

Bülow in 1906 to reform their colonial administration, or that stated on p. 326 of George W. F. Hallgarten, *Imperialismus vor 1914*, Bd. 2, 1951, where it is pointed out that a model of the Weimar Coalition is originally presented in "Kombination Bethmann" that made its appearance through the conversion of the Center Party subsequent to the formation of a left-wing block of the parliamentary majority covering "from Bebel to Bassermann" who promoted the passage of the bill of Imperial property increase tax during the Reichstag (Imperial Diet) of 1913.

3) W. Lotz, Wandlungen im deutschen Wirtschaftsleben und Wandelungen in der deutschen Wirtschaftswissenschaft seit Bismarcks Rücktritt, in *Hauptprobleme der Soziologie, Erinnerungsgabe für Max Weber*, Bd. 2, 1923, S. 311.

4) *Ibid.*, S. 313.

5) H. Ohtsuka, "The Social Geneology of Modern Entrepreneurs", *Business Review*, Vol. 11, No. 3, 1964, p. 10 f.

6) M. Yamada, *Analysis of Japanese Capitalism*, Iwanami Shoten, 1934, "Introduction", p. 2.

This historical sequence can be outlined, with particular attention paid to the embodiment of economic policy as follows:

As counter-measures in the period of the "Great Depression" that started with the panic of 1873, various policies centering around the socialists suppression law, social insurance law and protective tariff policy initiated by Bismarck had been put into effect. The Protective Tariff Law which was passed in the Reichstag (Imperial Diet) of 1879, for instance, may be seen to have been intended for the common interests of the Junker class and the upper stratum of the bourgeoisie as illustrated by the alliance of "Corn and Iron"⁷⁾ or the compromise between "Rye and Iron"⁸⁾, though there had been tangled problems as to the economic interests of various social strata within them. In particular, the tariff rate of 10 marks per ton on wheat and rye imposed in 1879 which was aimed at the protection of the economic interests of the Junkers of East Elbe who were semi-feudal landowners, was gradually raised as the agricultural panic that underlied the "Great Depression" became serious, and in 1885 the rate became 30 marks, then in 1887 it further went up to 50 marks. But, such a radical tariff policy for the protection of agriculture induced a retaliatory tariff policy against German industrial products on the part of such countries as Russia, at first, the U. S. A., Austria-Hungary, who were very much concerned with the export of their corn to Germany. This naturally resulted not merely in narrowing the export market for Germany, but also invited the lifting of domestic price levels for corn, which in turn raised the wages of workers. This meant that the internationally competitive power of an export industry based on cheap labour had been much reduced by that. Thus this protection policy for "Corn" had come to be a yoke as the demand for securing the world market became stronger, and finally with the withdrawal of Bismarck and with the subsequent emergence of Caprivi, "The New Course" (Der neue Kurs) was employed, whereby the tariff rate of wheat and rye was reduced to 35 marks per ton.

Evidently, with the withdrawal of Bismarck, the conflict between two

7) This particular point has been made clear by numerous labourious works such as K. Ohkouchi, *History of German Thought on Social Policy*, Nippon Hyoron Sha, 1936, p. 387; T. Yada, Age of Bismarck, in *Formation of European Imperialism*, Kawade Shobo, 1941, p. 151; T. Matsuda, "Establishment of Junker Administration and Middle-Class Peasants", *Historical Review (Rekishi Hyoron)*, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1948, p. 52; B. Eguchi, "Bismarck and Imperialism", Pt. 2, *Historical Journal (Rekishigaku Kenkyu)*, No. 144, 1950, p. 34; T. Murase, "Problems of German Revolutionary History", *Shiso*, No. 2, 1957, p. 137; K. Hayashi, "Problems on the Fall of Bismarck", *Shigaku Zasshi, (Historical Journal)*, Vol. 67, No. 2, pp. 46-57, etc. Further reference to these works is skipped here because of limited space.

8) Jürgen Kuczynski, *Die Bewegung der deutschen Wirtschaft von 1800 bis 1946*, 1948, S. 208.

9) Alexander Gerschenkron, *Bread and Democracy in Germany*, 1943, p. 45.

classes: the Junker class having had its dominant position still in politics and that of the bourgeoisie who had rapidly been gaining socio-economic power, was brought into prominence.

This conflict became more and more serious during the "Great Depression" on account of the structural change that had been taking place in German capitalistic society: particularly by its rapid shifting to the stage of advanced monopolistic capitalism in West Elbe combined with the administrative crisis of the Junkers in East Elbe created under the impact of agricultural panic. Junker-Prussian rule was then precarious, because its foundation of Junker administration was on the verge of disintegration from the effects of agricultural panic. However, the emergence of a camp which could overcome it was delayed. Thus after the policy of "Der neue Kurs" of Caprivi that could temporarily control the interests of the Junker class but soon failed, there came to take its place the "Sammlungspolitik" led by Johannes von Miquel and Karl F. von Stumm which aimed at "stabilization and new-equilibrium"¹⁰⁾ of the Imperial German social structure. This was then in a shaky state, being urged by the roll-back movement of Junker class based on the Bund der Landwirte (the Farmers' League)¹¹⁾ that succeeded in winning wide support from the peasantry. By the re-arrangement for the common interest of the Junker class and the upper stratum of the bourgeoisie at the meeting of the 19th and 20th centuries, the foundation for the internal government administration of "Junker-Bourgeois imperialism" came to be established, where a political system centering around the anti-subversion bill, fleet building policy and protective tariff policy were brought into being.

Thus "Sammlungspolitik" intended not only for the prevention of disintegration of the authoritative-hierarchical social structure of Imperial Germany, but also for its reinforcement, could prove to be successful for the time being, while all the policies of this period had a certain internal relationship with "Sammlungspolitik". The inner connection between the legislation of the 2nd Fleet Law in 1900 and the Tariff Law of 1902 which constituted the two mainstays of "Sammlungspolitik", had already been

10) E. Kehr, "Schlachtfloottenbau und Parteipolitik 1894-1901", *Historische Studien*, H. 197, 1930, S. 264.

11) The "Bund der Landwirte" (The Farmers' League) was not only organized in East Elbe but was rapidly extended to West Elbe and by 1900 the membership amounted to about 200,000. Thus at the beginning of the 20th century it came even to be regarded as "marching together under the banner of Bund der Landwirte all the peasants except few" (Oskar Stöckel, *Die politischen Parteien in Deutschland*, Bd. 2, *Der Liberalismus*, 1911, S. 165). Thus the fact, that the Conservative Party infused with fresh ideas and the Center Party succeeded in winning the support of the old middle class of peasant farmers as well as of handicraftsmen that faced destruction, was the important reason for the victory of the camp who pushed ahead "Sammlungspolitik", to which it is worthwhile to pay sufficient attention.

analysed by Lotz while this policy was still in the course of being effected¹²⁾, while Eckart Kehr laid the utmost emphasis on it¹³⁾, and George W. F. Hallgarten too pointed it out¹⁴⁾. Kehr in particular grasped the internal relation of the system of "Sammlungspolitik" on a wider basis and found its basic characteristic in that it "financed the fleet building by raising corn tariffs and combined agrarians and industrialists by malicious measures to have them mutually guarantee the rule of their partners against the charge of proletariat"¹⁵⁾.

According to the analytical viewpoint of Kehr, the internal government administration of Imperial Germany in the 1890's was regulated by two factors: (1) The struggle between industry and agriculture for the state hegemony in their respective efforts to improve their social position by taking advantage of state mechanisms, and (2) the struggle against the state and its social order by revolutionary proletariat. However such struggles were modified at the turn of the century (i) by the advance of the revisionism of Bernstein whereby revolution was replaced by evolution and (ii) in parallel with this, the era of the law against subversion came to an end on the part of the state and (iii) the struggle between Agrarian and industrialists came to be mediated by the "Sammlungspolitik" of Miquel. Thus Kehr understood that these struggles were brought to an end by these three factors.

In his understanding, however, the recognition of the mechanism of Junker-Prussian rule in the social structure of Imperial Germany and the subject of bourgeois reformation yet to be achieved is not necessarily clear¹⁶⁾, while importance is definitely placed on the aspect of the alliance between Junkerdom and bourgeoisie in confrontation with the proletariat. We too would naturally not overlook such aspect, but we would like to stress at the same time that also, on the part of bourgeoisie, an anti-Junker propensity to make alignment between labour and civilian develops, in contrast with the pro-Junker line where it tends to be combined with the Junker class, the ruler of Imperial Germany, in vying against the proletariat. This report places major importance on figuring out the typical pattern of the German bourgeoisie as seen in the reflection of its two conflicting attitudes to the "Sammlungspolitik".

12) Vgl. W. Lotz, "Die Handelspolitik des Deutschen Reiches unter Graf Caprivi und Fürst Hohenlohe (1890-1900)", *Schriften des Vereins für Sozialpolitik*, Bd. 92, 1901, S. 191.

13) E. Kehr, *op. cit.*, S. 204 Anm.; E. Kehr, "Englandhass und Weltpolitik", *Zeitschrift für Politik*, Bd. 17, 1928, S. 517 f.

14) Vgl. G. W. F. Hallgarten, *op. cit.*, Bd. 1, 1951, S. 412.

15) E. Kehr, *Schlachtflottenbau*, S. 147.

16) Refer, for example, to F. Engels, Criticism of the Draft of the Manifesto of the Social Democratic Party in 1891, in *Selected Works of Marx-Engels*, Japanese translation, Ohtsuki Shoten, Vol. 17, pp. 378, 384-385, 395.

II Basic Viewpoint in the Criticism on the "Policy of Uniting" by the Radical Union

Now, what kind of criticism was raised against "Sammlungspolitik" by the circle that supported the party line of the Radical Union (Freisinnige Vereinigung)?

(1) The "Sammlungspolitik" found its first public expression when Finance Minister Miquel made a speech requesting the reorganization of the so-called "Agro-Industrial Alliance" on July 15, 1897, but in October of the same year, Gerhart von Schulze-Gaevernitz, Professor of Freiburg University, gave a lecture in Karlsruhe on the subject of "Trade Policy and the Fleet" under the auspices of the Baden-Württemberg Gospel-Social Society and also at the gathering in January of the following year in Mannheim sponsored by the Merchant Union, the Chamber of Commerce and the Directors Meeting of the Stock Exchange, he made a similar speech where he criticized "Sammlungspolitik".

According to his manuscript reprinted in the journal "Die Nation" which is the revision of his lecture, (a) he first pointed out that for the first time an economic policy antagonistic to the class interests of the Junkers of East Elbe was pushed ahead by the trade policy of Caprivi, and praised the anti-Junker alignment between the bourgeoisie and labour achieved thereby.

(b) Then he studied the problem of trade policy from the two aspects; the one from the internal structural change in the German national economy and the other from the change in its relation with world economy, and thus he took up the issue of shifting to a so-called "industrial state". In his opinion, whereas in West Elbe the pivotal interest is found in the "industrial state", in East Elbe the shifting to the "industrial state" still remains not to be achieved. Thus, an important problem is involved in that Germany has not been converted to a "industrial state", but nevertheless, if the change in the relations of German national economy with world economy is questioned, her interest in the world economy should have a major bearing upon the German national economic interests. This is because of the fact that the export of German industrial products has already been playing a decisive role and that the shifting of Germany to an "industrial state" is a course that nobody can ever change¹⁷⁾.

As seen above, Schulze-Gaevernitz maintains that one should face the fact that the German national economy has been integrated into the

17) Gerhart von Schulze-Gaevernitz, "Handelspolitik und Flotte", Sonderabdruck aus der Wochenschrift *Die Nation*, Jg. 15, 1898, SS. 6-11.

world economy as an "industrial state", and that the relation between the implementation of economic policy pursuing the consistent promotion of bourgeois interests as well as the establishment of civil liberty and the proposed reinforcement of the German fleet, is of reciprocity, and therefore to want only the latter and try to restrict the former, induces a total contradiction. From this standpoint he bitterly criticizes the fact that "Junkerdom tries to sell a retrogressive economic policy with naval and military voting, thus maintaining his conventional political power and postponing his loss of economic status"¹⁸⁾, and thus directs his attack to the Junker class which blocks the German economic advance to the world market and which oppresses civil liberty. He warns that the continuation of political domination by big landowners in East Elbe will further aggravate the land restriction under the pressure of entailed estate (Fideikommiss) system, bring about land devastation and induce greater migration of Slav itinerant workers. Thus in his view the extensive territory of East Elbe will come to face great danger from the viewpoint of the national interest. He thus concludes that though immediate troubles may be patched up with makeshift counter-measures, sooner or later, an authentic and correct peasant policy should be worked out in the distribution of landed property, because the cause of all agricultural problems in East Elbe must be traced back thereto. He maintains that the correct policy towards the agricultural populace cannot be found so long as it is in line with Junkerdom, but is possible only when it is against Junkerdom as it was always so in the past. In this sense he objects that the policy deviates more and more from the right direction when the first step of a peasant-favouring policy must be directed against the entailed estate (Fideikommiss) system.

(c) The camp to be regimented for "the uniting of emulators (Gegensammlung)" along the anti-Junker line was, however, in the eyes of Schulze-Gaevernitz, in a condition to be worried about. He thus particularly directed his criticism to the oppression of civil liberties entailed by Junker-Prussian rule and to the upper stratum of the bourgeoisie that was prone to compromise with such a regime. He pointed out that by the pressure brought upon the peasants and civilians in East Elbe by the Junker class or by the denial of the right of organization of workers, the vast majority of the people were deprived of their civil freedom. This is illustrated by (1) the virtual lack of the right of assembly and organization in Hinterpommern and (2) that the upper-most stratum of the bourgeoisie in west and south Germany had often lost its enthusiasm

18) *Ibid.*, S. 26.

to reach to the lower social strata by adapting itself to the dominant approach of the Junker type as seen in East Elbe. Thus such "Fabrik-feudalen" (manufacturer-lords) tried to adopt a Junker style in their daily behaviour, as well as a Junker accent in their speech, to say nothing of their approach to politics and customs in their efforts to join the ruling class. They abandoned their own bourgeois interests and drifted away from the active majority of the bourgeois class in west and south Germany¹⁹⁾.

According to his viewpoint, the favourite policy pursued in Germany towards her labour movement was the policy of large landowners in East Elbe as attested by the Prussian bill of 1897 for the regulation of political association (Vereinsgesetz) which was intended to drive a wedge between capital and labour in its efforts to deter a possible alliance between the two which would have brought an end to Junker-Prussian rule. As it is clear from his approach, Schulze-Gaevernitz thought that the most important aim of German state affairs was to win the support of labour for political union, and that for this purpose a liberal administration was prerequisite. Thus he naturally came to criticize bitterly that such a prerequisite was prevented by the implementation of "Sammlungs-politik"²⁰⁾.

(d) Therefore, Schulze-Gaevernitz eagerly pushed ahead an anti-Junker line based on a labour-civilian tie-up in the implementation of a trade policy that guaranteed German advance into the world market as well as in the establishment of a liberal domestic administration particularly in the solution of the problems of labour and agriculture; and at the same time he wanted to create the internal administrative basis for the materialization of a naval policy which had historic character as a "bourgeois-industrial movement"²¹⁾ and which, for him, constituted a national problem. In this connection his greatest concern was to overthrow Junker-Prussian rule. For that purpose he presented the problem of land reform in East Elbe and pointed out that the first step in a pro-peasant policy must be taken against the entailed estate (Fideikommiss) system. It is thus worth paying sufficient attention to his warning issued against the tendency towards so-called "Junkerization of the bourgeoisie (Verjunkerung der Bourgeoisie)"²²⁾ which is alien to the inherent bourgeois interests, as well as against the so-called "feudalization of bourgeois class (Feudalisierung des Bürgertums)"²³⁾.

19) *Ibid.*, S. 26 f.

20) *Ibid.*, S. 28.

21) G. W. F. Hallgarten, *op. cit.*, Bd. 1, S. 384.

22) O. Stillich, *op. cit.*, S. 105.

(2) (a) Max Weber, Professor of Heidelberg University, gave a lecture in Mannheim in December 1897 on the subject of the "Historical Position of Modern Capitalism", in which he said that the time was approaching rapidly when the division of the world market would find its consummation in the Asian market, and that when such time came, nothing could have decisive influence in the overseas market but power or unreserved violence²⁴⁾, and by so saying he presented his cool-headed recognition of the realities of the stage of world history in his time. Towards the end of the same year he again raised his bitter criticism against "Sammlungspolitik" in his answer to the "Flottenumfrage", enquête made in connection with the bill of the 1st Fleet building.

He first pointed out that despite the time when "power alone makes the ultimate decision as to the extent of the share allowed in the economic domination on earth" was so quickly approaching, a wide circle of south-west German bourgeoisie was fatally lacking in recognition of realities, and he attributed this partly to the half-absolute monarchy and partly to the half-patriarchal German governmental system in the past 20 years which then came to be further distorted by the vulgar fear of the Red Monster, and consequently degraded into something antagonistic to national political education²⁵⁾. He further stressed that the ultimate and the only possible economic policy in the age of capitalism, whether people like or detest it, was to be found in the thorough pursuance of the logical consequences of bourgeois-industrial development, and not in the complacent policy of the so-called "Sammlung" carried out under anti-capitalistic slogans. Thus though he attached a significance to the demand for the commanding maritime power for the sake of the bourgeois class, he insisted that no fleet was necessary if it was for the protection of rent²⁶⁾.

Max Weber, here, with his unique insight into the social structure of Imperial Germany, sharply focused his attention on the contradictions inherent in the "Sammlungspolitik", saying it is only through the establishment of a free internal government administration able to put an end to Junker-Prussian rule by replacing the economic policy obsessed with an empty agricultural phrase of omnipotence by determined pursuit of various logical consequences of bourgeois-industrial development that the implementation of naval policy comes to assume its significance, and

23) Friedrich Zunkel, *Der Rheinisch-Westfälische Unternehmer 1834-1879*, 1962, S. 249.

24) Wolfgang J. Mommsen, *Max Weber und die deutsche Politik 1890-1920*, 1959, S. 87.

25) Stellungnahme zur Flottenumfrage der Münchener Allgemeinen Zeitung, Ausserordentliche Beilage Nr. 3 der Allgemeinen Zeitung vom 13. Januar 1898, in W. J. Mommsen, *op. cit.*, Anhang I, S. 420 f.

26) *Ibid.*, S. 421.

his criticism was directed to the wide circle of the south-west German bourgeoisie who failed to recognize such basic facts.

(b) Now, in the circle of bourgeoisie who took the lead in the "anti-Uniting Policy (Gegensammlung)" in support of the line of the Radical Union as in the case of Schulze-Gaevernitz, what sort of viewpoints were presented as their criticism of "Sammlungspolitik"?

(1) Emil Rathenau of A. E. G. Konzern, a monopoly-capital electrical machinery firm, in his answer to "Flottenumfrage" or enquête concerning fleet building made by Münchener Allgemeine Zeitung, said "a powerful fleet not only serves to elevate the German political position, but also to raise her position in the world market"²⁷. But he added, "in the current circumstances it is trade that is indispensable for the fleet rather than the fleet being indispensable for trade" and further said, "before having a powerful fleet, affluent industries and prosperous commerce must take priority",—"for several years those representing the agricultural interests have been demanding artificial restrictions on the activity of commerce and industry, as is indicated by the protective principles employed for concluding commercial treaties, for the law of trade association and the exchange law, etc. in their efforts to balance off the natural limitation of the productive capacity existing in the soil; however, it is absurd and nonsensical to try to protect our commerce and industry with arms from external threat when it is hit and wounded by laws at home"²⁸. So saying, he pointed out the urgent necessity of a thorough implementation of economic policy in support of bourgeois interests.

(2) Georg von Siemens who had been responsible for managing Deutsche Bank and the President of the Society of Commercial Treaty of which Emil Rathenau was also a member, also actively went against high agricultural protective tariffs as an Imperial Diet-member of the Radical Union based on the anti-Junker line. In May of 1901 when he gave a lecture in Magdeburg on the standpoint of his Society he accused the alliance of Agrariertum and heavy industry that interrupted the signing of commercial treaty by pursuing a protective tariff policy for the agro-industrial complex under the guidance of the Central Association of German Industrialists (Zentralverband deutscher Industrieller). The points of his criticism of "Sammlungspolitik" can be summarised into two as follows:

The first is that the main German agricultural product is no longer

27) E. Kehr, *Schlachtflottenbau*, S. 212.

28) *Ibid.*, S. 435.

corn but meat, and the demand of the Agrarier for high protective tariffs on corn not only results in price rises of foods, but harms the vast interests of the peasantry who raise cattle. The other is that import tariffs on industrial products protect only heavy industry, while the light and processing industries that employ the majority of the German working people are placed in a predicament by rises in price of necessary materials entailed by the heavier import duties on industrial goods and by that of foods caused by the protective tariff on corn.

From such viewpoint Siemens announced²⁹⁾ their intention to form a wide front, apart from supporting any specific political party, for the sake of the "Magenfrage"³⁰⁾ (question of stomach) of the people in support of the continuance of the current commercial treaty or the policy of "Der neue Kurs" of Caprivi. However the interests of light and processing industries for export come to the front against the alliance between the Agrariertum and heavy industry, and nothing is done about the land issue that questions the big landownership in East Elbe which constituted the social foundation of Imperial Germany. In this connection it is considered that there is a basic difference between the viewpoint of Rathenau or Siemens and that of Schulze-Gaevernitz or Weber.

(3) (a) Now the line of "Sammlungspolitik", was successfully achieved by the majority parties of the Reichstag such as the Conservative Party, Imperialist Party, National Liberal Party, etc., when they passed the reformation tariff bill in 1902 by ousting the move of "Gegensammlung" of the Social Democratic Party, Radical Union and Radical People's Party, etc. The problem of promoting an anti-Junker line by labour-civilian tie-up was presented anew when Theodor Mommsen who became the President of Berlin University in 1874 and a worthy opponent of Bismarck during 1881-'84 as an Imperial Diet-member of the separated fraction of National Liberal Party, made a pathetic request which could be considered as his last injunction.

In December 1902, in the midst of the deliberation of the tariff bill by the 3rd reading of the Reichstag when the fixing of minimum tariffs of 55 marks per ton of wheat, 50 marks per ton of rye and oats and 40 marks per ton of barley was proposed by Herold of the Center Party supported by the congressional majority, and when the tariff reformation was about to be enforced in the way still more reactionary than the government draft turning down the opposition raised by the left and

29) Rede des Reichstagsabgeordneten Dr. G. v. Siemens, Vorsitzenden des Handelsvertragsvereins, gehalten am 8. Mai 1901 zu Magdeburg, 1901, SS. 9-14.

30) *Ibid.*, S. 14.

right wings such as the Social Democratic Party, Radical People's Party, Radical Union and Farmers' League, Mommsen made public an essay under the title of "What can still save us" in the journal "Die Nation". In this, he warned that Germans were standing at a starting point, not at a terminal of a coup d'état where the Kaiser of Germany and the Reichstag surrendered to the absolutism of the alliance of mutual interests between Junkerdom and chaplain ruling³¹⁾, and appealed that if there were a way out of this coup d'état, it must be through nothing else but union among all political parties, including the Social Democratic Party, who are not taking part in this treason, saying "nothing is more necessitated at this critical and serious moment than to have co-operation between liberals who are still qualified to call themselves such and the labour party for this purpose on both sides conversion and reversion are necessary"³²⁾.

This deeply involves his criticism of the deviation of the bourgeoisie, that had originally to be the torchbearer of bourgeois liberalism, towards a pro-Junker line as was illustrated by the camp belonging to the right wing of the National Liberal Party or to the Imperialist Party who pushed ahead "Sammlungspolitik".

(b) Then what had caused such deviation by the bourgeoisie towards a pro-Junker line and brought about an inherent pattern of "Junkerization of bourgeoisie" or "feudalization of bourgeois class"? It was Weber coming to face the so-called "new phase of production"³³⁾ who made a sharp analysis of the causes. Weber, in his criticism of the bill of "Familienfideikommiss", not only made a severe attack on the propensity of the bourgeoisie to seek Nobilitierung (ennoblement) by setting up Fideikommiss, but also disclosed the Imperial German economic policy that fostered and spread such propensity as well as the historical characteristics of its authoritative-hierarchical social structure. Thus he traced back to the basic cause that produced a pro-Junker line on the part of the bourgeoisie. To Weber, the bill of "Familienfideikommiss" was a typical case where the efforts of conservatives were used for breaking up the united front of bourgeois class against the big landownership of East Elbe³⁴⁾. In 1904 he published a labourious work "Agrostatistical-Socialpolitical Observation for the Problem of Entailed Estate in Prussia", in which he criticized Prussian land policy that aimed to fortify Junker-

31) Th. Mommsen, "Was uns noch retten kann", *Die Nation*, Jg. 20, Nr. 11, in Lujo M. Hartmann, *Theodor Mommsen*, 1908, S. 255.

32) *Ibid.*, S. 257.

33) Marianne Weber, *Max Weber*, 1950, SS. 316, 372 f, translation by K. Ohkubo, Misuzu Shobo, pp. 221, 257.

Prussian rule by expediting the Nobilitierung of bourgeoisie through the establishment of Fideikomnisse as well as the bourgeoisie themselves who intended to climb up to the Briefadel (nobility obtained by letters patent) along such lines. At the same time he probed to the bottom that the content of the bill of "Familienfideikomnisse" in Prussia was in complete contradiction to the promotion of domestic colonial policy³⁵⁾. The matter of concern for Weber was the reorganization of the social structure of Imperial Germany that tried to maintain Junker-Prussian rule as well as the land reform in East Elbe by pushing ahead domestic colonial policy. Since dissolution of Junkerdom, as the supplying source of military and bureaucratic forces that were mainstays of the state power of Imperial Germany³⁶⁾, could alone be the basis for the reorganization, he made thorough inquiries that the bill would pave the way to the establishment of Fideikomnisse. If the best land were to be placed at the disposal of the vanity and control of "agrocaptalism"³⁷⁾, it came to be direct contradiction of the formation of peasantry by domestic colonial policy.

(4) So far some observations have been made as to the basic approach of criticism of "Sammlungspolitik" by the circle of the Radical Union. Though quite a difference can be seen between the approaches, one common basis that we cannot overlook, exists. That is, an antagonism between the old type-bourgeoisie that tried to create a domestic governmental foundation of "Junker-Bourgeois imperialism" through implementation of "Sammlungspolitik" to cope with the new situation developed as German capitalism shifted to highly monopolistic capitalism, and the new type-bourgeoisie who pressed the anti-Junker line of labour-civilian tie-up in their belief that the establishment of a liberal domestic governmental foundation that enabled the achievement of bourgeois interests was prerequisite. The old type-bourgeoisie was a stubborn advocate of subordinate labour relations³⁸⁾ based on "Herr-im-Hause-Standpunkt" which could be compared to the Junker rule in Gutsbezirk (manorial district) of East Elbe, supporting the anti-subversion bill (Umsturzvorlage), the political association bill (Vereinsgesetz), the imprisonment bill (Zuchthausvorlage), etc. and was an oppressor of civil liberties such

34) W. J. Mommsen, *op. cit.*, S. 110.

35) M. Weber, Agranstatistische und sozialpolitische Betrachtungen zur Fideikommissfrage in Preussen (1904), in *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Soziologie und Sozialpolitik*, 1924, SS. 323-393.

36) K. Sumiya, "Max Weber as an Editor of Grundriss der Sozialökonomik", *Shiso*, No. 10, 1963, p. 66.

37) M. Weber, *op. cit.*, S. 393.

38) K. Ohkouchi, *op. cit.*, p. 587; E. Ohno, *On History of German Finance-Capital Formation*, Yuhikaku, 1956, pp. 188-189, 232.

as the right of organisation of labour, rights of assembly and political organisation, etc. In contrast with this, new type-bourgeoisie, with their concern with "quality labour" (Qualitätsarbeit)³⁹⁾ and going against the "Herr-im-Hause-Standpunkt", tried to create independent, rational labour relations that could cultivate the quality of labour, and demanded the establishment of a domestic administration free from Junker-Prussian rule. Thus the two antagonistic patterns of the bourgeoisie: the one, the old type-bourgeoisie that aimed to protect their own interests jointly with the Junker class in the face of the growing strength of the proletariat, and the other, the new type-bourgeoisie that intended a tie-up with labour and civilians to be freed from Junker-Prussian control. Such antagonism was the undercurrent of the circle of the Radical Union who raised criticism against the driving force of "Sammlungspolitik".

Further the criticism of the circle of the Radical Union directed at "the intention of social ascension"⁴⁰⁾ of the upper stratum of bourgeoisie who converted themselves upward to be a bulwark of Junker-Prussian rule by submitting their own bourgeois interests to the latter as an integral part of Imperial German social structure, went beyond the frame of comments upon current problems and rightly hit upon the typical nature of the bourgeoisie that gradually gained weight in the Imperial social structure and that came to be highlighted through the withdrawal of Bismarck. The understanding of this aspect is particularly necessary when the historical nature of the rule of German monopoly-capital or finance-capital at the turn of the 19th century is questioned⁴¹⁾.

In order to deepen our understanding of the typical nature of such German bourgeoisie, this paper makes some analysis of the Prussian statistics regarding the establishment of "Fideikomnisse", a mainstay for the realization of "the intention of social ascension" by the bourgeoisie.

39) O. Stillich, *op. cit.*, S. 127.

40) F. Zunkel, *op. cit.*, S. 108.

41) For example, when Prof. K. Ohkouchi said "After Bismarck's withdrawal in 1890 from the stage where a drama of compromise between Junker and the newly developing capital power, the political advance of the capital power gradually gained ground but behind this process.....there were such hidden facts as the transformation of German capitalism to imperialism from the 1890's to the beginning of the 20th century, the establishment of the ruling power by monopoly-capital, as the economic foundation of the former, namely the achievement of supremacy by Rhineland heavy industrial capital" (*ibid.*, p. 387) or when Prof. K. Hayashi said that the conversion from "old era" (*ibid.*, p. 46) as illustrated by the Bismarck tied with old type financial capitalist Bleichröder to "new era" as indicated by "Wilhelm II who joined his hands with new Konzern like Krupp" (*ibid.*, pp. 52-53) had a certain internal relation with the change in the nature of German capitalistic society, the historical nature of the rule of monopoly-capital or finance-capital as comprehended as "newly developed Konzern like Krupp" must be studied in the perspective of Imperial German social structure; and the problem lies at this very point.

III Typical Characteristics of German Bourgeoisie

—In Light of the Analysis of the Statistics of Fideikomnisse in Prussia—

(1) When one takes a look at the statistics of Fideikomnisse in Prussia (Table 1), attention is called first to the increase trend in the number of Fideikomnisse and their total area. The ratio of total area of Fideikomnisse as against that of Prussia had remarkably increased from 4.5 % at the end of 1870 to 7.3 % at the end of 1918 under the Imperial German regime of about half a century. The total area of about 2,530,000 hectares of Fideikomnisse at the end of 1918 was almost as large as that of the Westprussian province. When such increase trend of Fideikomnisse is examined according to the year of its establishment, in parallel with the establishment of old Fideikomnisse such as those converted from Lehnsgut (estate in fee) which were mostly situated in purely remote agrarian regions, we notice that there were remarkably numerous cases of the establishment of new Fideikomnisse in the superior area in proximity to markets⁴²⁾, during the time when German capitalistic society advanced to the stage of highly monopolistic capitalism through industrial revolution.

Whereas the conversion of Lehnsgut to Fideikomnisse (Table 4) registered particularly large numbers by the middle of the 19th century and during the 1880's, and it was almost completed by the end of 1880's, the establishment of new Fideikomnisse (Table 2 and 4) increased after the 1880's and their number registered sharp increase particularly during the 10 years from the beginning of the 20th century.

It was not altogether incidental that the cases of establishment of new Fideikomnisse showed sharp increase during the period when that "empty agricultural phrase" had controlled economic policy since the protective tariff policy was adopted by the alliance of "Corn and Iron" in 1879. In other words, the establishment of Fideikomnisse tremendously increased riding on the high tide of the conservative current and was further expedited by the Imperial German economic policy. As, for example, Max Weber stated "Our all economic policies foster Rentner (rentier) and the tendency to enable to secure otium cum dignitate by the bourgeois capital investment in land will rapidly gain its ground with further satiation of German capital possession and with the widened mutual isolation by protective closed policy among various countries"⁴³⁾, the economic policy of Imperial Germany accelerated capital excess by

42) M. Weber, *op. cit.*, S. 330.

43) *Ibid.*, S. 372 Anm.

Table 1. Fideikomnisse in Prussia

| End of Year | Number of Fideikomnisse | Total Area of Fideikomnisse (1,000 ha) | Ratio of Total Area of Fideikomnisse as against that of Prussia | Ratio of Agricultural Area of Fideikomnisse as against that of Prussia | Ratio of Wooded Area of Fideikomnisse against that of Prussia |
|-------------|-------------------------|--|---|--|---|
| 1850 | 519 | 1,249 | — | — | — |
| 1860 | 609 | 1,424 | — | — | — |
| 1870 | 707 | 1,564 | 4.5% | — | — |
| 1880 | 817 | 1,761 | 5.1 | — | — |
| 1890 | 981 | 1,953 | 5.6 | — | — |
| 1895 | 1,045 | 2,122 | 6.1 | 4.4% | 11.9% |
| 1900 | — | 2,198 | 6.3 | — | 12.1 |
| 1905 | — | 2,260 | 6.5 | — | 12.6 |
| 1910 | 1,251 | 2,407 | 6.9 | — | 13.6 |
| 1912 | 1,277 | 2,449 | 7.0 | 4.9 | 13.8 |
| 1914 | 1,311 | 2,467 | 7.1 | 5.0 | 13.5 |
| 1918 | 1,348 | 2,531 | 7.3 | 5.1 | 13.9 |

C. v. Dietze, Fideikomnisse, in *Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften*, 4. Aufl., Bd. 3, 1926, S. 998.

Table 2. Establishment of Fideikomnisse in Prussia

| Years of Establishment | Numbers of Establishment | % | Yearly Mean | Present Area | % | Average Area |
|------------------------|--------------------------|-------|-------------|--------------|-------|--------------|
| To 1850 | 516 | 40.4 | — | 1,245,441 ha | 50.9 | 2,414 ha |
| 1851-1860 | 88 | 6.9 | 8.8 | 174,235 | 7.1 | 1,980 |
| 1861-1870 | 96 | 7.5 | 9.6 | 140,388 | 5.7 | 1,462 |
| 1871-1880 | 103 | 8.1 | 10.3 | 184,567 | 7.5 | 1,792 |
| 1881-1890 | 163 | 12.8 | 16.3 | 191,858 | 7.8 | 1,177 |
| 1891-1895 | 56 | 4.4 | 11.2 | 125,633 | 5.1 | 2,243 |
| 1896-1900 | 61 | 4.8 | 12.2 | 78,833 | 3.2 | 1,292 |
| 1901-1905 | 59 | 4.6 | 11.8 | 102,220 | 4.2 | 1,733 |
| 1906-1910 | 102 | 8.0 | 20.4 | 157,341 | 6.4 | 1,543 |
| 1911-1912 | 33 | 2.6 | 16.5 | 48,710 | 2.0 | 1,476 |
| Total to 1912 | 1,277 | 100.0 | | 2,449,226 | 100.0 | 1,918 |

H. Hoepker, "Die Fideikomnisse in Preussen im Lichte der Statistik bis zum Ende des Jahres 1912", *Zeitschrift des königlich preussischen statistischen Landesamts*, Jg. 54, 1914, S. 49.

Table 3. Scale and Distribution of Fideikomnisse in Prussia at the End of 1912

| State Provinces | (I) Total Area of State or Province | (II) Area of Fideikomnisse | $\% = \frac{(II)}{(I)}$ | Ratio of Wo- oded Area of Fideikomnisse |
|----------------------------|--|-------------------------------|-------------------------|---|
| A State | 34,880,133.7 ha | 2,449,225.6 ha | 7.0 | 46.6% |
| B Provinces | | | | |
| I Ostpreussen | 3,700,163.3 | 146,887.5 | 4.0 | 29.3 |
| II Westpreussen | 2,555,795.5 | 118,091.2 | 4.6 | 42.6 |
| III Stadtkreis Berlin | 6,341.5 | — | — | — |
| IV Brandenburg | 3,984,400.7 | 343,294.6 | 8.6 | 52.3 |
| V Pommern | 3,013,406.8 | 248,301.2 | 8.2 | 28.2 |
| VI Posen | 2,899,373.8 | 206,967.4 | 7.1 | 36.5 |
| VII Schlesien | 4,033,768.0 | 698,107.2 | 17.3 | 57.0 |
| VIII Sachsen | 2,526,947.5 | 127,025.4 | 5.0 | 41.4 |
| IX Schleswig-Holstein | 1,901,891.8 | 141,728.5 | 7.5 | 19.5 |
| X Hannover | 3,851,133.0 | 82,211.2 | 2.1 | 46.4 |
| XI Westfalen | 2,022,260.8 | 157,629.8 | 7.8 | 58.7 |
| XII Hessen-Nassau | 1,570,233.9 | 78,540.5 | 5.0 | 65.8 |
| XIII Rheinprovinz | 2,700,193.1 | 81,649.6 | 3.0 | 57.4 |
| XIV Hohenzollernsche Lande | 114,224.0 | 18,791.5 | 16.5 | 77.8 |

H. Hoepker, *op. cit.*, S. 10 f.

Table 4. Establishment-Numbers of Fideikomnisse in Prussia (Parenthesized Numbers Indicate the Numbers of the Conversion of Lehnsgüter to Fideikomnisse)

| State Provinces | To 1912 | To 1850 | 1851 1860 | 1861 1870 | 1871 1880 | 1881 1890 | 1891 1895 | 1896 1900 | 1901 1905 | 1906 1910 | 1911 1912 |
|----------------------------|------------|------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| A State | 1,277(249) | 516(79) | 88(21) | 96(21) | 103(43) | 163(74) | 56 (9) | 61 | 59(2) | 102 | 33 |
| B Provinces | | | | | | | 117(9) | | 161(2) | | |
| I Ostpreussen | 75 (16) | 24 (7) | 5 (2) | 12 (2) | 1 (1) | 12 (4) | 3 | 4 | 4 | 8 | 2 |
| II Westpreussen | 35 (2) | 9 (1) | 3 | 2 (1) | — | 2 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 9 | 3 |
| III Stadtkreis Berlin | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| IV Brandenburg | 138 (35) | 43 (2) | 8 (1) | 9 | 16(11) | 26(13) | 11 (6) | 4 | 7(2) | 12 | 2 |
| V Pommern | 125 (38) | 35 (7) | 10 (2) | 8 (6) | 22(15) | 16 (7) | 10 (1) | 5 | 6 | 7 | 6 |
| VI Posen | 76 | 3 | 4 | 7 | 9 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 5 | 28 | 4 |
| VII Schlesien | 213 (23) | 85 (9) | 7 | 14 (4) | 12 (5) | 30 (4) | 7 (1) | 15 | 13 | 21 | 9 |
| VIII Sachsen | 141 (73) | 26(10) | 11 (5) | 6 (2) | 19(10) | 57(45) | 7 (1) | 4 | 6 | 3 | 2 |
| IX Schleswig-Holstein | 78 (9) | 52 (8) | 4 (1) | 3 | 5 | 2 | 1 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 1 |
| X Hannover | 138 (28) | 89(19) | 11 (5) | 16 (3) | 5 | 2 (1) | 5 | 4 | 3 | 3 | — |
| XI Westfalen | 102 (4) | 77 (4) | 3 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 3 | 1 |
| XII Hessen-Nassau | 107 (19) | 49(10) | 17 (5) | 13 (3) | 7 (1) | 5 | 2 | 7 | 3 | 4 | — |
| XIII Rheinprovinz | 43 (2) | 18 (2) | 5 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 |
| XIV Hohenzollernsche Lande | 6 | 6 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |

H. Hoepker, *op. cit.*, SS. 38-43.

restricting the field of capital investment on the one hand and by protecting "corn" raised the rent of superior land, particularly wheat land on the other and consequently submitted such wheat land to the wider land restriction by Fideikomnisse.

Now if the specific feature in the increase trend of Fideikomnisse as examined above is further examined on a provincial scale (Table 4), establishment of new Fideikomnisse was widespread during 1880-'90 and 1901-'10 in the provinces of Silesia which was called the "classic country of Fideikomnisse"⁴⁴⁾ and Brandenburg, while in Posen province the number established was overwhelmingly concentrated during 10 years from 1901 and in other provinces such as Westprussia and Eastprussia the case is the same.

Thus the area of Fideikomnisse at the end of 1912 (Table 3) occupied 17.3 % of the total area of Silesia province, 8.6 % of Brandenburg province and not only in the East Elbe but also in the West Elbe the high percentage of 7.8 as in the province of Westfalia was occupied thereby.

The establishment of Fideikomnisse in Prussia was banned by Article 38 of the Constitution granted by Prussian King in 1848 in the midst of the stormy "March Revolution", but with the victory of counterrevolution the Article of the Constitution which stipulated the abolition of Fideikomnisse, was deleted by the law of 1852⁴⁵⁾ and it reverted to the status prior to the "March Revolution". Later, in keeping up with the progress of German capitalism, the establishment of Fideikomnisse showed an increase trend and besides, its trend was extended from East Elbe to many parts of West Elbe. It is not difficult to infer that such a phenomenon had a certain inner relation to the progress pattern of German capitalistic society that enabled the continuance of socially favourable treatment of landownership or with historical nature of her social structure and that the hope for ascension of bourgeoisie to the status of Briefadel through establishment of Fideikomnisse played no small role therein. Max Weber, in this connection, saw into the inherent nature of the affair saying "the tendency of land acquisition by bourgeois capital is no longer limited to the east, but is already a universal tendency, and it can be weakened only when the socially favourable treatment of landownership disappears"⁴⁶⁾. He further pointed out that the economic policy of Imperial Germany was further accelerating the tendency in

44) *Ibid.*, S. 343 Anm.

45) Vgl. Franz Horsten, *Die Familien-Fideikommiss-Politik in Preussen*, 1924, S. 29 ff.; A. Yamada, *Formation Process of Modern Landownership*, Yushindo, 1958, p. 174 f.

46) M. Weber, *op. cit.*, S. 359 Anm. Further refer to Lysbeth Walker Muncy, *The Junker, In the Prussian Administration under William II, 1884-1914*, 1944, p. 26, where she describes the

East Elbe and was likely to transplant it into West Elbe.

(2) When this tendency is examined in the light of the movement of the bourgeoisie in Rhine-Westfalia, it is obvious that the collapse of the "March Revolution" played a major role in inviting such a turning-point.

(a) Though in the "pre-March period" "the intention of social ascension" was noticed among bourgeoisie who owned knights' estates (Rittergüter) or some wealthy entrepreneurs, it was still an individual phenomenon, and in the days of moral uplifting in the movement of bourgeois-liberal emancipation such intention was regarded as a breach of faith against political and social attitudes to be assumed by the bourgeois class and was bitterly criticized by Gustav Mevissen and others. Consequently such intention was considered as that of an "egoistic outsider"⁴⁷⁾.

(b) However, with the collapse of the "March Revolution" and in the midst of the industrial rise during the 1850's, "the intention of social ascension" among entrepreneurs of Rhine-Westfalia gradually became a collective phenomenon, and with Prussian victories in the Prusso-Austrian War in 1866 and in the Prusso-French War of 1870-'71 and with the achievement of German unification under Prussian leadership, the reconciliation of entrepreneurs of Rhine-Westfalia to Junker-Prussian rule and their integration into the authoritative-hierarchal social structure of Imperial Germany had decidedly advanced. "In the bourgeois class of Rhine-Westfalia"—as in the middle classes all over Germany—the great national success of the government and the ruling class made it possible to subjugate social strata consisting of primarily small and middle manufacturers, merchants, middle-class officials, and national school teachers, to authoritative and monarchical political rule and to integrate them into the hierarchy of Prussian society and all these middle classes (Mittelstand) entirely abandoned the resistance against the system and way of life of the nobility", said Friedrich Zunkel⁴⁸⁾.

(c) Before the birth of the new German empire, because of the resistance by the old nobility to the "swollen Briefadel"⁴⁹⁾ and also thanks to the control of the Prussian King who gave priority to the military officers and government officials, the ascension to Briefadel of Rhineland manufacturers and bankers was very limited while the ennoblement of bourgeoisie was centered in Berlin rather than in the west.

situation toward the end of 19th century when "bourgeois merchants and industrialists" were extensively gaining the knights' estates (Rittergüter) for socio-economic reasons.

47) F. Zunkel, *op. cit.*, S. 108.

48) *Ibid.*, S. 130.

49) *Ibid.*, S. 121.

Besides, the weight was particularly placed on the bankers in Berlin who had financial ties with the government or high-ranking officials. However after the foundation of the empire, particularly since the beginning of 1880's, ennoblement of many entrepreneurs was made by the policy of Bismarck intended to absorb the leading industrial and financial circles into the side of state interests, driving a wedge into bourgeois liberalism; thus to many entrepreneurs hailing from Rhine-Westfalia ennoblement was granted. That Mevissen, once a radical critic of the "intention of social ascension" of the bourgeoisie, as a brain of the Rhine bourgeoisie, belonged to the Free Conservative Party inaugurated in 1867 by Magnaten (magnates) of Silesia, for the purpose of firmly maintaining "the foundation of military-beaurocratic state of Prussia"⁵⁰⁾, and later in 1884 was ennobled⁵¹⁾; or that in 1887, after the death of Alfred Krupp, all assets left by him was fixed into Fideikommiss, etc.⁵²⁾, all these symbolically account for what has been mentioned above.

(3) In the above, the reason why the phenomenon of the so-called "Feudalization or Junkerization" of the bourgeoisie had quickly spread with the emergence of Imperial Germany was outlined, and now if the distribution of Fideikommiss, a mainstay by which the bourgeoisie came to hope for "social ascension" is examined by reference to the statistics (Table 5) arranged according to the class of proprietor and scale in Prussia each at the end of 1895, 1903, 1912, then it is found out that the "other nobility" became a majority in 1912, numbering 664 persons (57.2 %), and the growth in this category was most conspicuous, while the "bourgeois class" too showed remarkable increase in the number of Fideikommiss proprietors from 90 persons (9.6 %) in 1895 to 110 (10.6 %) in 1903, and further to 136 (11.7 %) in 1912. As H. Hoepker rightly pointed out saying, "quite often the bourgeois who owns Fideikommiss is ennobled, therefore, those owing Fideikommiss who ascend into 'other nobility' deviating from 'the last group' should not be overlooked"⁵³⁾, it must be sufficiently recognized that the group of "other nobility" comprehends a great number of "new nobility (Neuadel)"⁵⁴⁾ of ennobled bourgeoisie. At any rate through the transition in the proprietors of Fideikommiss such as "other nobility" and "bourgeois" it can be easily understood that there was a sharp increase of "new nobility", and the

50) Johannes Ziekursch, *Hundert Jahre schlesischer Agrargeschichte*, 1915, S. 391.

51) Joseph Hansen, *Gustav von Mevissen, Ein rheinischer Lebensbild 1815-1899*, Bd. 1, 1906, S. 841.

52) Rudolf Keibel, "Aus Hundert Jahren deutscher Eisen- und Stahlindustrie", *Schmollers Jahrbuch*, Jg. 38, 1914, S. 897.

53) H. Hoepker, "Die Fideikommiss in Preussen in Lichte der Statistik bis zum Ende des Jahres 1912", *Zeitschrift des königlich preussischen statistischen Landesamts*, Jg. 54, 1914, S. 51.

54) F. Zunkel, *op. cit.*, S. 132.

Table 5. Distribution of Fideikomnisse according

| State Classes of Proprietors | | Fideikomnisse- Proprietors | | under 100 ha | | 100-200 ha | | 200-500 ha | |
|---------------------------------|--------|-------------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------|---------------------|------------|---------------------|------------|----------------------|
| | | Number | Area | Number | Area | Number | Area | Number | Area |
| State | { 1895 | 939 | 2,121,412 ^{ha} | 83 | 3,645 ^{ha} | 50 | 7,063 ^{ha} | 149 | 51,070 ^{ha} |
| | { 1903 | 1,034 | 2,197,111 | 97 | 4,107 | 51 | 7,309 | 167 | 57,130 |
| | { 1912 | 1,160 | 2,449,226 | 108 | 4,704 | 57 | 8,361 | 184 | 65,236 |
| Classes of Proprietors | | | | | | | | | |
| I Royal Family | { 1895 | 23 | 204,077 | 1 | 30 | 2 | 266 | 1 | 216 |
| | { 1903 | 24 | 194,188 | 1 | 52 | 2 | 266 | 1 | 216 |
| | { 1912 | 25 | 227,941 | 2 | 107 | 3 | 455 | — | — |
| II Standesherr | { 1895 | 41 | 326,844 | 1 | 57 | 1 | 101 | 4 | 1,437 |
| | { 1903 | 37 | 286,538 | 1 | 57 | 1 | 101 | 3 | 825 |
| | { 1912 | 37 | 291,511 | 1 | 57 | 2 | 281 | 2 | 562 |
| III Fürst | { 1895 | 20 | 229,761 | — | — | — | — | 2 | 697 |
| | { 1903 | 27 | 266,441 | — | — | — | — | 2 | 697 |
| | { 1912 | 29 | 276,799 | — | — | — | — | 2 | 697 |
| IV Graf | { 1895 | 240 | 733,866 | 3 | 128 | 3 | 453 | 18 | 6,631 |
| | { 1903 | 251 | 760,669 | 3 | 105 | 3 | 453 | 18 | 6,675 |
| | { 1912 | 269 | 825,621 | 4 | 165 | 4 | 724 | 19 | 7,582 |
| V Other Nobility | { 1895 | 525 | 589,043 | 38 | 1,970 | 27 | 3,882 | 113 | 38,405 |
| | { 1903 | 585 | 642,807 | 44 | 2,145 | 30 | 4,500 | 127 | 43,434 |
| | { 1912 | 664 | 773,948 | 41 | 2,115 | 32 | 4,722 | 138 | 48,264 |
| VI Bourgeois | { 1895 | 90 | 37,821 | 40 | 1,460 | 17 | 2,361 | 11 | 3,684 |
| | { 1903 | 110 | 46,468 | 48 | 1,748 | 15 | 1,989 | 16 | 5,283 |
| | { 1912 | 136 | 53,406 | 60 | 2,260 | 16 | 2,179 | 23 | 8,131 |

"Die Fideikomnisse in Preussen am Ende des Jahres 1895", *Zeitschrift des königlich Preussen am Ende des Jahres 1903*", *Zeitschrift des königlich preussischen statistischen*

emergence of such "swollen Briefadel" in the Imperial Germany entailed the extensive reshuffle in blood-relation among nobility classes and thus brought about reorganization of the ruling class. This was implied by Zunkel when he said "the old Prussian ruling class has thus come to be ousted in the new empire by the elite of aristocratic and yet bourgeois entrepreneurs as well as by that of agricultural and yet industrial entrepreneurs, from whom emerged the real representatives of the imperialism and nationalism of the young German empire"⁵⁵⁾.

This "new nobility" is the very class that came to prominence with

55) *Ibid.*, S. 132.

to the Class of Proprietor and Scale in Prussia

| 500-1,000 ha | | "Herrschaften" | | | | "Latifundien" | | | |
|--------------|-----------------------|----------------|-----------------------|----------------|-----------------------|-----------------|-----------------------|-----------------|-----------------------|
| | | 1,000-2,000 ha | | 2,000-5,000 ha | | 5,000-10,000 ha | | 10,000 ha above | |
| Number | Area | Number | Area | Number | Area | Number | Area | Number | Area |
| 196 | 144,186 ^{ha} | 204 | 293,613 ^{ha} | 164 | 491,067 ^{ha} | 59 | 412,775 ^{ha} | 34 | 717,993 ^{ha} |
| 210 | 154,526 | 228 | 322,181 | 187 | 558,677 | 60 | 404,583 | 34 | 688,598 |
| 227 | 166,566 | 276 | 392,190 | 207 | 622,090 | 64 | 422,463 | 38 | 767,616 |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| 1 | 795 | 5 | 8,650 | 3 | 10,623 | 5 | 36,346 | 5 | 147,151 |
| 1 | 795 | 4 | 6,677 | 4 | 12,929 | 5 | 33,380 | 6 | 139,873 |
| 1 | 807 | 3 | 5,576 | 4 | 15,402 | 4 | 26,938 | 8 | 178,656 |
| 2 | 1,357 | 9 | 13,702 | 6 | 20,698 | 8 | 58,344 | 10 | 231,148 |
| 3 | 2,100 | 6 | 8,328 | 8 | 26,916 | 6 | 41,588 | 9 | 206,623 |
| 1 | 580 | 7 | 10,064 | 9 | 31,387 | 6 | 42,023 | 9 | 206,557 |
| 1 | 749 | 2 | 2,205 | 2 | 6,041 | 4 | 34,246 | 9 | 185,823 |
| 1 | 749 | 2 | 2,204 | 7 | 22,432 | 6 | 44,458 | 9 | 195,901 |
| 1 | 749 | 4 | 5,050 | 7 | 22,416 | 5 | 37,841 | 10 | 210,046 |
| 34 | 26,177 | 71 | 102,876 | 67 | 211,727 | 35 | 242,532 | 9 | 143,342 |
| 36 | 27,961 | 68 | 97,670 | 76 | 237,536 | 38 | 254,597 | 9 | 135,672 |
| 36 | 28,121 | 72 | 102,790 | 85 | 262,829 | 39 | 261,564 | 10 | 161,846 |
| 151 | 109,782 | 105 | 149,516 | 83 | 233,652 | 7 | 41,307 | 1 | 10,529 |
| 155 | 113,085 | 135 | 190,606 | 88 | 247,948 | 5 | 30,560 | 1 | 10,529 |
| 170 | 123,382 | 173 | 245,846 | 100 | 285,011 | 9 | 54,097 | 1 | 10,511 |
| 7 | 5,326 | 12 | 16,664 | 3 | 8,326 | — | — | — | — |
| 14 | 9,836 | 13 | 16,696 | 4 | 10,916 | — | — | — | — |
| 18 | 12,927 | 17 | 22,864 | 2 | 5,045 | — | — | — | — |

preussischen statistischen Bureau, Jg. 37, 1897, S. 15; F. Kühnert, "Die Fideikommiss in Landesamts", Jg. 45, 1905, S. 215; H. Hoepker, *op. cit.*, S. 33.

the withdrawal of Bismarck as a turning-point and was the driving force of "Sammlungspolitik" as led by Stumm of the Imperialist Party and Miquel who belonged to the right wing of the National Liberal Party. The reorganization of the ruling class was, of course, not what helped promote the collapse of Imperial German social structure, but was rather an indication of its being a bulwark of Junker-Prussian rule by integrating the upper stratum of bourgeoisie into the social structure as "new nobility", and was nothing but the intention of reinforcement of the ancien régime. We find thus the major pattern of the bourgeoisie of Imperial Germany in this "new nobility".